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China’s cooperation approach demonstrated through the Belt 
and Road Initiative is quite different in comparison to regional 
integration in Europe. Geographical limits, differences in 
culture, value systems, social and political realities make such 
a comparison disputable. The aim of this paper is not to 
compare the European integration experience with the most 
significant Chinese cooperation project. The study is rather 
focused on briefly evaluating the cooperation model applied by 
China towards the region of Central and Eastern Europe and 
the way it interacts with and affects theEU integration model. 
It also gives consideration to the evolving geopolitical situation 
at the regional and global levels. Methodologically, the study 
builds on an interdisciplinary approach that allows for 
assessing the problem in historical, legal, economic, and 
diplomatic aspect. The methodological framework is 
supplemented by the application of some instruments of 
geopolitical analysis.The paper argues that China’s approach 
towards the CEE region has the potential to exacerbate some 
of the divisions within the increasingly fragmented European 
Union.  
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1. Introduction  
The Belt and Road Initiative, (BRI) launched in 2013, has appeared in a 
period when a series of crises have shaken the very foundations of the European 
integration project. For the first time in its history, the European Union faces 
questions over not only the speed and the direction of its future development, 
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While the European Union is at crossroads, the world witnesses the 
expansion of China’s foreign policy interests. China’s growing ambitions are 
illustrated through the Belt and Road initiative as its major cooperation 
initiative in the last decades and the most ambitious geostrategic project on the 
global stage. The Central and East European states have an important role in 
ensuring connectivity between China and Europe which is the major aim of the 
Chinese initiative. The region appears as a new strategic focus of China’s 
diplomatic activity that poses some challenges to the domination of the EU 
integration project in this part of Europe. 
The study evaluates the way the EU integration approach and China’s 
cooperation model meet and interact particularly in the region of Central and 
Eastern Europe (CEE). Ituses Chinese understanding of the CEE region – 
demonstrated through the “16+1”format - that includes the Baltic States, the 
Visegrad Four of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia, the six 
former Yugoslav republics of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, North 
Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, Slovenia, as well as Albania, Bulgaria and 
Romania (Greece joined the format in April 2019 making it ‘17+1’). The aim 
is to discuss how and to what extend the deepening China – CEE relationship 
affects the idea of the EU uniqueness.First, the paper explores the EU 
integration model and the Chinese cooperation approach that are based on 
different values, culture and philosophy. Then the expanded economic 
engagement of China with the CEE region and the role of China as an 
alternative source of economic benefits are examined. Third, the paper analyzes 
how the success of the Chinese model challenges the idea of universality of the 
EU’s political model. Fourth, it considers the role of China as a new geopolitical 
and geoeconomic actor in the CEE region. The paper argues that the Chinese 
cooperation approach demonstrated through the Belt and Road Initiative is a 
challenge to the uniqueness of the EU integration model. Methodologically, the 
study builds on an interdisciplinary approach that allows assessing the problem 
in historical, legal, economic, and diplomatic aspect. The methodological 
framework is supplemented by the application of some instruments of 
geopolitical analysis.  
 
2. Different values, different approaches 
The European Union (EU) is frequently identified as the most successful 
example of regional cooperation in the world. The European integration 
experience is often regarded as a benchmark and a universal point of arrival. It 
is associated with peace, stability and prosperity. The EU itself “fell head over 
heels for its social and political model” (Krastev, 2017, p. 8).  
The EU project enjoyed a full dominance in the region of Central and 
Eastern Europe after the end of the Cold war and the years of wars in the 
Western Balkans. All the CEE countries bound their futures with a membership 
of the Euro-Atlantic structures. The European Union was viewed by these 
countries as the “Promised Land”. The EU membership was seen as a 
mechanism for establishing stability, receiving much needed resources and 
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achieving development. To be admitted to the “Promised Land” and to get the 
“carrot”, however, the countries were obliged to meet strictly defined political, 
economic, institutional criteria, known as the Copenhagen criteria.  
The developments following the 2008 economic crisis have revealed, 
however, that there is a decline in the EU geopolitical position and control in 
the region as well as an erosion of the hegemony of the European project in the 
Western Balkans after the failure of the Thessaloniki Agenda1. This process has 
been further reinforced by the migrant crisis in 2015. An analysis worked out 
by the Directorate General of the Policy Department of the European 
Parliament for External Policies clearly notes that “one of the bigger challenges 
in the six remaining Western Balkans accession countries in the years to come 
will be to keep elites and citizens motivated to continue the reform process” 
(European Parliament, 2015, p. 5).  
Taking advantage of the situation in that period China has strengthened 
its penetration in the entire CEE region. It has happened in a period of China’s 
growing international participation and expanding economic activity. In the 
beginning of the second decade of the 21st century China has availed itself of 
the CEE countries’ need of fresh capital investment. Beijing has increased its 
economic involvement in the region benefiting from the already existing and 
growing tensions between Eastern and Western Europe based, not least, on 
different historical experience and political culture. 
The expanded engagement of China with the region challenges the 
European model of regional integration itself. China’s approach is best 
illustrated through the Belt and Road Initiative. The initiative put forward by 
China’s president in 2013 provides the comprehensive framework for country’s 
domestic and foreign policy. It is one of the key China’s instruments for 
achieving global influence and recognition.  
The BRI is applied in Central and Eastern Europe through the 16+1 
format and it contrasts sharply with the EU treaty-based integration concept. 
The approach of Beijing is predetermined by traditional Chinese values, culture 
and philosophy. These are quite different from the Western cultural values that 
are politically and ideologically loaded. 
Instead of the EU “stick and carrot” policy, with a long negotiation 
period for the candidate states and obligatory integration in the centre’s 
geopolitical orbit (Western security system), China offers a more pragmatic 
and flexible cooperation model that pretends to correspond to specific national 
traditions, needs, realities and international contexts. What makes China’s 
approach different from the Western one is its normative base that is focused 
on consensus, equality, inclusiveness, win-win cooperation (Grieger, 2018, p. 
2).   
 
1‘The Thessaloniki agenda for the Western Balkans: Moving towards European 
Integration' was adopted by the European Council at the EU – Western 
Balkans Summit that took place in Thessaloniki, Greece in 2003. It was the 
first time that the EU demonstrated a real political will to give a clear European 
perspective to the countries from the Western Balkans.   
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One of the major differences between the EU and the Chinese approach 
refers to the attitude taken to national sovereignty. While the EU integration 
model emphasizes the transfer of sovereignty, in China's political discourse, the 
concept of absolute sovereignty remains a key category. Officially, Beijing 
does not seek any political affiliation or any military dominance. Instead of 
heavy legal and institutional architecture in Central and Eastern Europe, it 
offers a loose platform for the development of primarily bilateral cooperation 
(the 16+1 initiative). The Prime Minister of Hungary V. Orban said in 2017:  
We see the Chinese president's 'One Belt, One Road' 
initiative as the new form of globalisation which does not 
divide the world into teachers and students but is based on 
common respect and common advantages. (Teffer, 2017) 
China’s cooperation model embodies a very different political tradition 
and culture and assigns a different place to ideology. The European Union seeks 
to impose the Western liberal order on the EU candidate countries. In order to 
receive EU funding and enter the European club of rich countries, the 
candidates must meet the criteria regarding democratic principles, rule of law, 
market economy, and respect for human rights as defined by the EU institutions. 
One of the key accession criteria a candidate must satisfy to become an EU 
member state is related to its administrative and institutional capacity to 
effectively implement the acquis communautaire i.e. the EU legislation, its 
norms and standards that are an emanation of liberal democracy.  
China’s rationale is different. There is no normative agenda in its 
cooperation strategy. Chinа’s strategy emphasizes economics over norms, 
sovereignty over supranational obligations (Jakomow, 2019, p. 381). Beijing 
does not seek to impose policy conditions but tries to adapt its own strategy to 
the local environment. In line with its tradition, China does not seek to impose 
its values on others but lets them know these values and gradually recognize 
them (Kissinger, 2012, pp. 5-22). China increasingly relies on the attractiveness 
and success of its own model of development. 
The Chinese believe that the universe unites diversity. Many differences 
exist in the universe, nature, and society but differences do not necessarily 
result in conflict or contradiction, according to them. Chinese leadership 
adheres to the principle of seeking coexistence and common prosperity despite 
diversity when implementing its foreign policy strategy (Lihua, 2013, p. 2). 
While implementing the BRI, China focuses primarily on the pragmatic 
cooperation between countries and strictly follows the principle ofnon-
interference in the internal affairs of states. According to Beijing, diversity of 
ideology, political and social system does not impede win-win cooperation, 
inclusiveness, common development, prosperity, peace and harmony between 
states. The document entitled “Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk 
Road Economic Belt and 21st Century Maritime Silk Road”, which was 
issued in March 2015 by China’s National Development and Reform 
Commission, the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of 
Commerce points out: 
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The Belt and Road Initiative aims to promote the connectivity 
of Asian, European and African continents and their 
adjacent seas, establish and strengthen partnerships among 
the countries along the Belt and Road, set up all-
dimensional, multi-tiered and composite connectivity 
networks, and realize diversified, independent, balanced and 
sustainable development in these countries. (National 
Development and Reform Commission, 2015) 
 
3. China as an alternative source of economic benefits 
The active Chinese policy towards the CEE region has already given 
results. While being over-focused on the Russia threat, after 2014, the European 
Union seems to have missed the increasing economic involvement of China in 
the region. Johannes Hahn, Commissioner for European Neighbourhood Policy 
and Enlargement Negotiations, admitted in March 2019, “Maybe we have 
overestimated Russia and underestimated China, and we should give both their 
right place” (Hopkins, 2019).   
After a standstill in their relations, China and the countries from Central 
and Eastern Europe re-discovered each other in the mid-2010s. Taking 
advantage of the temporary inability of the European Union to fully project its 
power in this part of Europe as a result of the 2008 financial and economic 
crisis, Chinese companies seized the opportunity and offered the countries from 
the region much needed fresh investments. The European Union remains a 
dominant actor in the region but Beijing has substantially increased its 
engagement and has appeared as a new and important external actor in Central 
and Eastern Europe. China is already seen as an alternative source of economic 
benefits that applies a different model of interaction with its partners. 
China plays a dominant role in the development of Sino-CEE relations. 
The 16+1 initiative launched by Beijing in 2012 is the major platform and core 
instrument of China’s policy towards the region as well as a key component of 
the Belt and Road Initiative. Announcing the initiative, Chinese prime minister 
Wen Jiabao outlined four major principles for the development of China – CEE 
relations: strengthening pragmatic economic cooperation; broadening the 
cooperation areas; improving the cooperation mechanism; consolidating the 
foundation for cooperation (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s 
Republic of China, 2012).  
A practical network of structures aimed at further facilitating bilateral 
economic and financial cooperation has been initiated by China. China – CEE 
Investment Cooperation Fund, China - CEEC Business Council, China-CEEC 
Investment Promotion Agencies Contact Mechanism, China-CEEC Bank 
Consortium, among others, operate within the 16+1 format as a key driving 
force behind Sino-CEE relations.  
All CEE countries signed a Memorandum of understanding with China 
on the BRI. This ambitious initiative offers a new consolidation approach by 
uniting diverse countries and establishing transborder communication 
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corridors. It applies an all-embracing strategy that gives a new impetus to the 
China – CEE relation in the economic as well as in the political field. The 
improved China – CEE political dialogue is illustrated through the increased 
number of high-level visits. Since 2009, the region has been visited three times 
by the Chinese president (in 2009, 2016 and 2019) and ten times by the Chinese 
prime minister. 
Despite the existing gap between the enthusiastic rhetoric of the 16+1 
and the economic reality on the ground (Eder & Mardell, 2018), there was still 
an increase in trade volumes between China and CEE countries of 30% in 2010-
2015 (Global Times, 2016). The countries from the Visegrad Group (the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia) have the highest share of China-CEE 
trade volume and the highest deficit values as well (Table 1). China is the 
second-biggest trading partner of the countries from the Western Balkans2 
(European Commission, 2020a). Machinery and transport equipment is the 
most significant product group of CEE exports to China (UNCTAD, 2016). 
CEE countries’ exports to the Asian country, however, differ significantly. The 
Visegrad Group’s exports are dominated by foreign multinationals and high 
value-added products and the exports of the Balkan countries are mainly 
dominated by low value-added products and some raw materials (Karásková et 
al., 2020, pp. 35-42).  
 
Table 1: Imports, Exports and Trade Balance in Goods between the EU 
Member States in CEE and China, 2013-2019 (EUR million) 
 Export Import Balance 
 










2013 2015 2017 2019 
Bulgaria 651 551 637 814 7.8 767 966 1109 1484 13.8 -116 -416 -472 -671 
Croatia 57 70 125 108 2.1 956 525 707 726 13.6 -898 -455 -582 -618 
Czech 
republic 




Estonia 99 136 219 173 3.8 576 625 688 651 16.7 -477 -490 -469 -478 
Hungary 1435 1263 1579 1456 6.1 5169 5574 5612 7470 24.9 -
3734 
-4311 -4033 -6014 
Latvia 86 108 135 159 3.0 342 417 441 511 12.1 -256 -308 -306 -352 
Lithuania 88 102 180 277 2.1 565 725 823 929 8.7 -477 -623 -643 -652 








Romania 499 525 737 612 3.3 1972 2887 3788 4537 19.3 -
1473 
-2362 -3051 -3925 
Slovakia 1596 1020 1213 1690 10.5 2468 2720 3078 2904 17.2 -871 -1700 -1865 -1214 
Slovenia 169 294 562 435 3.9 1018 1459 1436 2016 13.6 -849 -1165 -874 -1580 
Data source: Eurostat 
 
Though the European Union remains the major player in terms of foreign 
direct investment (FDI) in CEE region, Chinese FDI has expanded significantly 
since 2008. However, it still accounts for less than 3% of all Chinese 
 
2Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia.  
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investments in the European Union. Chinese FDI is still concentrated in 
Europe’s largest economies of the United Kingdom, Germany and France. 
Among CEE countries, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Czech Republic are the 
top recipient countries for Chinese investments (Kratz et al., 2020, p. 10). 
Chinese investment activity in the region covers different sectors and 
industries. Chinese state-owned or state-controlled companies have acquired 
strategic assets in the region. There is a specific interest in strategic fields such 
as transport and energy infrastructure, nuclear energy, green energy, mineral 
raw materials industry, agriculture, and telecommunication. This interest is 
determined by China’s ambition to push forward the Belt and Road initiative.   
Infrastructure seems to be a key element in China’s investment policy 
towards the Central and Eastern Europe. According to the Mercator Institute 
for China Studies, Beijing has (co-) financed completed infrastructure projects 
in the CEE region worth USD 715 million in the period 2013-2017 (Eder & 
Mardell, 2018).The development of a network of infrastructure facilities in the 
region could be regarded as a component of Beijing’s plan to eventually link 
China and Europe. Chinese financial institutions provide loans and Chinese 
companies develop different segments of the rail and highway track of the Belt 
and Road initiative in the region of Central and Eastern Europe. These sections 
are also elements of different Pan-European corridors that have had a special 
place in the EU enlargement strategy, but Brussels was unable to provide for 
their further development. These are, among others, the flagship project for the 
high-speed rail line from Belgrade to Budapest that has to be constructed by a 
Chinese company, the highway connecting Serbia and Montenegro and the 
reconstruction of the railway from Belgrade to the south of Serbia, towards 
North Macedonia and Greece and the Chinese-owned port of Piraeus, in 
particular. Some of these Chinese projects, however, have not been finished.  
Beijing pays special attention to the development of cooperation with the 
CEE countries in the energy field. While the European Union has been focused 
on countering Russia’s influence in the Balkan energy sector, in particular, and 
has been exerting pressure on EU member states and candidate countries from 
the region to further liberalize their energy sector, China has made strategic 
investments in a number of energy projects. Stanari thermal power plant, for 
example, is the first thermal power plant project designed and constructed by a 
Chinese company in Europe. There are also Chinese investments in 
hydropower and in the renewable energy sector of the CEE region. There has 
also been an expressed Chinese interest in the nuclear sector of Bulgaria and 
Romania, in particular.  
The volume of CEE investments in China has also increased, though it 
remains at a very low level because of the very low starting point - from USD 
420 million in 2003 to USD 1.1 billion in 2015. These investments come 
primarily from Hungary, Poland, Romania, The Czech Republic, Slovakia and 
Bulgaria (China – CEE Liaison Mechanism for Investment Promotion 
Agencies, 2016, p. 17). 
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If the forecasts for a severe European recession as a result of the 
coronavirus pandemic come true3, China could once again appear as an 
alternative source of funding and investments for the CEE countries. A rise in 
China’s investments activities in the region could be seen again as an alternative 
instrument for closing the development gap with Western Europe. The 
European Commission has already issued a warning: “the Member States need 
to be vigilant and use all tools available at Union and national level to avoid 
that the current crisis leads to a loss of critical assets and technology” (European 
Commission, 2020b). However, while the EU member states in the CEE region 
have the responsibility for the application of EU laws, the Western Balkan 
countries offer looser regulation practices. 
 
4. The contested idea of universality of the EU’s political model 
The European Union currently faces the most serious challenge in its 
history. The Union is increasingly fragmented and in a process of fundamental 
transformation. It has witnessed deep internal dilemmas, profound divisions 
and antagonisms which were intensified by the migrant crisis in 2015. China’s 
penetration and approach towards the CEE region has the potential to further 
exacerbate some of these divisions within the European Union, mostly between 
“Old Europe” (Western Europe) and “New Europe”, post-communist East and 
South East European countries4, without explicitly looking for this effect.  
The CEE countries were among the “losers” in the Cold War and the 
West, though starting to integrate them, demonstrated a patronizing attitude. 
Most of the CEE countries were totally oriented towards the West pursuing 
Euro-Atlantic integration but they had first to prove that they deserved to be 
part of the Euro-Atlantic community.  
China did not lose the Cold war. Against the background of the fall of 
communism in Eastern Europe, China denied the universality of the Western 
system of liberal democracy. The Chinese Communist Party continued to rule 
and lead country’s historic transformation and turn China into the world's 
second-largest economy. The unprecedented economic growth in the last four 
decades allowed Chinese leaders to talk about a Chinese model of development. 
The concept of “Beijing Consensus” has appeared as an alternative to the 
neoliberal “Washington Consensus” (Ramo, 2004, p. 3).  
China’s state-led model has proved that it also can deliver economic 
growth and social welfare, thus challenging liberal democracy and its 
values. Andrew J. Nathan, professor of political science at Columbia 
University, points out that China “encourages authoritarian regimes by the 
power of its example” (Nathan, 2015, p. 158). Joshua Cooper Ramo who coined 
the “Beijing Consensus” phrase notes that: 
 
3According to the European Commission the EU economy is expected to shrink by 7.4 
percent in 2020.  
4In 2003, U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld divided the European continent into 
what he called "old Europe" and "new Europe" with respect to the countries’ 
reaction to the Iraq war.  
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China is marking a path for other nations around the world 
who are trying to figure out not simply how to develop their 
countries, but also how to fit into the international order in 
a way that allows them to be truly independent, to protect 
their way of life and political choices in a world with a single 
massively powerful center of gravity.(Ramo, 2004, p. 3) 
Russian sinologists A.V. Vinogradov and A. Salitskii pay particular 
attention to the declarations made at the 19 th National Congress of the 
Communist Party of China when it was stated that China’s specific way of 
development is acquiring the features of integrity as an independent, social 
development project alternative to the West (Vinogradov & Salitskii, 2019, 
pp. 78-83).  
The Chinese alternative model drew attention in the context of the 
negative effects of the 2008-2009 global financial crises and was seen as 
an alternative to the free market approach imposed by the “Washington 
Consensus”. Francis Fukuyama wrote in 2012:  
Many people currently admire the Chinese system not just for its 
economic record but also because it can make large, complex 
decisions quickly, compared with the agonizing policy paralysis that 
has struck both the United States and Europe in the past few years. 
Especially since the recent financial crisis, the Chinese themselves 
have begun touting the “China model” as an alternative to liberal 
democracy. (Fukuyama, 2012) 
Currently the COVID-19 pandemic again reveals some advantages 
of “the China model” based on strong state power and control. China’s 
system of governance – though in contradiction with EU set of values and 
principles - proves to be efficient in a crisis situation. At the same time, the 
COVID-19 crisis has further exposed some deficiencies in the Western 
liberal democracy system and some flaws in the EU project itself. In the 
midst of the coronavirus pandemic Ivan Krastev, a permanent fellow at the 
Institute for Human Sciences in Vienna, notes:  
Unfortunately, the coronavirus could increase the appeal of the 
big data authoritarianism employed by the Chinese government. 
One can blame Chinese leaders for the lack of transparency that 
made them react slowly to the spread of the virus, but the 
efficiency of their response and the Chinese state’s capacity to 
control the movement and behavior of people has been impressive. 
In the current crisis, citizens constantly compare the responses 
and effectiveness of their governments with those of other 
governments. And we should not be surprised if, the day after the 
crisis, China looks like a winner and the United States looks like 
a loser. (Krastev, 2020)  
In the midst of the coronavirus crisis the French president Macron 
says: “We are at a moment of truth, which is to decide whether the 
European Union is a political project or just a market project” (Mallet & 
Khalaf, 2020). These words come as a reaction to the unpreparedness and 
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initial lack of solidarity within the Union when many governments in the 
EU gave preference to national interests and sovereignty over supranational 
mechanisms. A poll commissioned by the European Council on Foreign 
Relations in nine EU countries5 shows that people believe the EU 
responded poorly to the crisis and that “the EU did not rise to the challenge” 
and was “irrelevant” (Krastev & Leonard,  2020, p. 11). 
Amid coronavirus crisis, Serbia’s President Aleksandar Vucic 
accused the European Union of a lack of solidarity and declared that his 
country turn to and rely on China in the struggle against the virus (Simić, 
2020). The “Financial Times” quotes Dusan Reljic, head of the Brussels 
office of the German Institute for International and Security Affairs, as 
saying: “The EU’s ability to assert itself in the Western Balkans, and especially 
in the largest and most politically important state in the region, Serbia, seems 
to have weakened since the outbreak of the pandemic.” (Barber, 2020).  
In an article in the influential Chinese newspaper Global Times, 
Professor Ding Yifan from Beijing Foreign Studies University emphasizes 
that the European Union resorts to policies which it has decried before.He 
points out that “European politicians have no grounds to accuse Chinese 
state-owned enterprises of violating market competition” as they also turn 
to state interventionism in the current crisis situation (Ding Yifan, 2020).  
This does not mean that the Central and East European countries will follow 
the “China model”. The current situation, however, provides China with a new 
opportunity to improve its image and to demonstrate the vitality of its 
alternative model of development that delivers economic growth. The success 
of the Chinese model challenges the very idea of universality of the EU’s 
political model.  
In CEE, China’s growing engagement could converge with current trends in 
some of the countries which have been criticized for bad democratic 
performance and further challenge the EU cohesion. “An illiberal drift in 
Central and Eastern Europe” is often assessed by the Western political leaders 
as one of the key challenges facing the European Union (Raines et al., 2017, p. 
4). Ivan Krastev notes that:  
there is a genuine crisis of liberal democracy in Central and 
Eastern Europecaused by a major economic crisis, publics’ 
backlash against globalization and some of the core beliefs 
of liberal cosmopolitanism, and decline of the role of Europe 
and the European Union in world politics. (Krastev, 2016) 
The migrant crisis has clearly shown some differences in values 
between Western and Eastern Europe. The former has remained focused on 
multiculturalism and universalism, the latter – generally speaking - on 
sovereignty and cultural identity.Rising nationalism and euroscepticism in 
 
5Bulgaria, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden.  
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some of the CEE countries threaten to make these East-West fault lines within 
Europe even more apparent. Hence, China’s increasing interest in the region 
and its specific approach could be viewed by some of these countries as an 
opportunity to increase their influence within the European institutional and 
strategic balance and to evade their further marginalization within the Union 
itself. 
Since the establishment of the 16+1 format, Brussels has been suspicious 
of China’s growing activity in the CEE region despite China’s declarations that 
the format does not go against the EU but is in line with the EU-China “strategic 
partnership” agenda. There are EU fears that the Chinese involvement in the 
region could challenge precisely the unity of the European Union and that the 
Chinese could exploit EU member states from Central and Eastern Europe as a 
kind of a “China lobby” (Godement, 2011, p. 2). The experts of the European 
Council on Foreign Relations note that “expressions of support for European integration 
have always coexisted in China’s official line with a recurring trend for playing on the diversity 
and potential division of Europe” (Godement & Vasselier, 2017, p. 74). Hungary’s 
decision to block an EU statement criticizing China’s new security law in Hong 
Kong, for example, is grist to the mill for those sharing such views. 
It is obvious that the CEE region provides China not only easy access to 
the EU market but also some political leverage. China could use its economic 
engagement for political support on important foreign policy issues. For 
example, Beijing’s influence became clear in the EU debate on an international 
court ruling on China’s claims to maritime rights and resources in the South 
China Sea in July 2016. Then, the European Union could not reach a common 
position that directly criticized China’s policy as Greece and Hungary – relying 
on Chinese investments – objected. The “Financial Times” concludes that the 
potential of 16+1 initiative to shape future EU votes, in general, is a serious 
concern in some European capitals as the Union requires unanimity on most 
matters of common foreign and security policy, including sanctions (Kynge & 
Peel, 2017). 
The lack of internal unity could easily endanger the ability of the Union 
not only to develop a single strategy towards China but also to formulate and 
implement common EU policy, in general. This would mean lesser EU 
integration, lesser EU influence on potential members’ strategic choices as well 
as a weakened reform agenda promoted by Brussels (Makocki, 2017). 
Focusing on implementing its Belt and Road strategy, China will keep 
on going into areas of EU competence, presenting the “Chinese way” and 
challenging the dominance of the EU integration model in the region. China’s 
entry intoEU’s sphere of competence is being facilitated by processes that take 
place within the Union itself. Britain’s exit, for example, would deprive 
Brussels of some 12 billion euro from an annual budget running around 140 
billion euro (Reuters staff, 2018). Further reorganization of the Multiannual 
Financial Framework for the period 2021-2027 was imposed also by the need 
to address the effects of the COVID-19 crisis. Against the background of 
gloomy forecasts for the EU economy, the European leaders agreed on the 
establishment of a 750 billion euro recovery fund to tackle the effects of the 
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coronavirus pandemic – a compensation for the initial lack of solidarity and 
weak reaction of the EU institutions to the COVID-19 crisis. Resources from 
the EU Recovery instrument will be channeled through some of the European 
structural and investments funds. These funds are particularly important for the 
countries in Central and Eastern Europe as they aim to reduce economic and 
social disparities across Europe. For the 2014-2020 period the Cohesion Fund, 
for example, concerns 15 EU member states. Eleven of these countries are part 
of the 16+1 format, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia. The KPMG study 
on European Structural and Investment Funds in Central and Eastern Europe 
for the 2014-2016 period also reveals that for CEE countries the EU funds 
continue to represent a main resource for public funding (KPMG, 2017).  
The Multiannual Financial Framework for 2021–2027 (excluding the 
Recovery Plan) agreed by the European Council in July 2020 envisages a 
reduction of the allocation for cohesion policy. A review of the new 
Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) shows also that there is a re-grouping 
of the spending programmes where the new Cohesion, resilience and values 
heading includes also Erasmus+, RescEU programme, Health programme, 
Creative Europe programme and Justice, Rights and Values programme. Thus, 
the share of the cohesion funds proposed for the 2021-2027 MFF is in fact 
30.7% compared with 34% for 2014-2020 (European Council, 2020, p. 21). 
Any decrease in cohesion policy allocations could further undermine the efforts 
to overcome the remaining economic and social divisions between the Eastern 
and Western part of the continent, to ensure a balanced recovery and could even 
erode the idea of the EU’s transformative power.   
Against that background, China could once again appear as an alternative 
source of economic growth for the countries in the region, especially for the 
Western Balkans countries. Beijing has the advantage that the access to China-
backed projects remains easier. For example, in order for EU member states to 
receive funding under the newly agreed Recovery fund, they have to present 
national recovery and resilience plans setting out the reform and investments 
agenda of the country. These plans have to be assessed by the European 
Commission and then approved by the Council by qualified majority (European 
Council, 2020, p. 5). In conformity with the “emergency brake” mechanism, 
transfers of funding from the recovery fund could be temporarily stopped if an 
EU member state is seen by any other member state as not meeting reform 
conditions.  
At the same time, China sees EU norms, rules and conditionality as a hindrance 
to business and prefers to adhere to a more flexible approach and ad hoc 
agreements. Instead of the EU’s cumbersome bureaucratic approval and control 
procedures, China offers bilateral deals without any strictly predefined set of 
standards and parameters. On the one hand, this policy is quite acceptable for 
some of the countries in the region. “While the Europeans are acting towards 
Greece like medieval leeches, the Chinese keep bringing money,” said 
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Konstantinos Douzinas, the head of the Greek Parliament’s foreign affairs and 
defence committee and a member of the governing Syriza party (Horowitz & 
Alderman, 2017). On the other hand, however, as M. Makocki states, this 
approach tilts the balance between the market-oriented and the state-led model 
to the latter’s favour and causes disillusion with the market and governance 
reforms promoted by the EU (Makocki, 2017).  
 
5. China as a new geopolitical and geoeconomic actor in the 
region 
In 2014, in a speech before the European Parliament the then President-
elect Jean-Claude Juncker declared:  
When it comes to enlargement, I fully recognize that this has 
been an historic success that brought peace and stability to 
our continent. However, the Union and our citizens now need 
to digest the addition of 13 Member States in the past ten 
years. The EU needs to take a break from enlargement so 
that we can consolidate what has been achieved among the 
28. This is why, under my Presidency of the Commission, 
ongoing negotiations will continue, and notably the Western 
Balkans will need to keep a European perspective, but no 
further enlargement will take place over the next five years. 
(Juncker, 2014, p. 11) 
Six years later, the EU has hardly achieved the goal of “consolidating” 
the Union but it has reinforced its enlargement policy. The Bulgarian 
Presidency of the European Union (with a specific focus on the European 
perspective of the Western Balkans) during the first half of 2018 is one of the 
reasons but hardly the key one.  
In a short period of time Montenegro was accepted into NATO in 2017 
and the EU accession perspective for Montenegro and Serbia was revitalized. 
Bulgaria and North Macedonia hastily signed and ratified bilateral friendship 
agreement in 2018. A new impetus was given to the negotiations on the name 
dispute between Greece and Macedonia. Under Western pressure, the two 
countries signed the Treaty of Prespa in June 2018 putting an end to the long-
lasting dispute but opening new fault lines within their own societies6. North 
Macedonia became the 30th member of NATO in March 2020. After the initial 
cancellation of the start of EU membership talks and despite the reservations of 
France, Netherlands and Denmark, the EU has given North Macedonia and 
Albania formal approval to begin accession talks in March 2020. Though the 
process has been blocked by Bulgaria, the EU institutions remain strongly 
committed to the European future of these countries. New impetus was given 
also to the EU-led negotiations between Serbia and Kosovo in 2020. In the face 
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of geopolitical competition both from Russia and China, the EU has also 
announced a €3.3 billion support plan for the Western Balkans in tackling 
COVID-19 in May 2020 (Barber 2020).  
The reinforced Western diplomatic activity in the Balkans, whether it is 
an EU initiative or a US-driven endeavour is, is obviously part of the effort for 
the consolidation of the supremacy of the West in Central and Eastern Europe. 
For the EU, this is perhaps one of the last chances to assert its influence and 
position of a dominant actor in the region. The EU membership is an effective 
instrument for the EU to guarantee peace, stability and development on its 
periphery but also to secure the sustainability of the Western influence and 
Western rules of the geopolitical game in the region.  
Certainly, the CEE region is particularly important in the context of the 
growing tensions between the West and Russia. But geo-economic and geo-
political rationale is in force when it comes to China, as well. In 2019, the EU’s 
institutions changed their approach to China viewing it not only as an economic 
competitor but also as a “systemic rival promoting alternative models of 
governance” (European Commission, 2019, p. 1). In 2020, the EU High 
Representative Josep Borell called for “collective discipline” and “a more 
robust strategy for China” (European External Action Service, 2020). The 
foreign minister of Austria K. Kneissl warned in 2018, “Who will be first in 
Belgrade - China or the EU? It is that [which] we have to counteract, as it is our 
immediate neighbourhood” (Baczynska & Mauhagen, 2018). “With Brussels’ 
commitment to the (Balkan) region in doubt, China’s ‘Belt and Road’ Initiative 
offers an attractive alternative to countries losing hope in the endless wait to 
join the EU”, writes J. Mardell (Mardell, 2019). 
China has always been in the periphery of the geo-political game in 
Central and Eastern Europe (Miheev & Shvydko, 2016, p. 49). In recent years, 
however, it appears as a new actor in the complex geo-political reality in the 
region, thus challenging the interests and policy of the other external powers 
that are actively involved in the CEE. For China, Central and Eastern Europe is 
an increasingly important component of the realization of the Belt and Road 
Initiative which has the potential to change the global geopolitical landscape. 
As J. Hillman from the Centre for Strategic and International Studies notes, “to 
China, the countries from Central and Eastern Europe are important in their 
own right but also as a bridge into the EU” (Kynge & Peel, 2017). The CEE 
region is important for China as “a geographical point of entry of BRI’s two 
broadly defined corridors stretching from China to Europe” (Pavlićević, 2019, 
p. 250). 
Against the background of the divergent geopolitical strategies of 
different EU member states, the successful development of the CEE section of 
the Belt and Road initiative would give a strategic advantage to China. The idea 
of establishing a common Eurasian economic space also contradicts the 
geopolitical imperatives of the United States. The increasing involvement of 
China in the region would also change the role of CEE in the geopolitical 
configuration of the European continent. Aiming at establishing a new trade 
link between the region and Asia, China affects intra-EU relations and helps 
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the Central and East European economies to move away from their peripheral 
role within the EU (Van der Putten & Meijnders, 2015, p. 6). Some of the CEE 
countries could use the situation to develop a more diversified and pragmatic 
foreign policy and to attempt to increase their geopolitical weight and 
manoeuvring space.  
The rising tensions between Beijing and Washington will further impact 
the triangular relationship between the EU, China and the CEE countries. The 
CEE region is a battleground in the strategic competition between China and 
the United States. Romania, a close ally of the United States, has already 
cancelled a deal with China General Nuclear Power (CGN) for the construction 
of two new nuclear reactors at the Cernavodă Nuclear Power Plant – one of 
China’s biggest projects in the region. There is strong US pressure on European 
countries to impose firm restrictions on Huawei activity as a supplier of 5G 
technology in Europe. The Czech Republic, Poland, Estonia, Lithuania and 
Romania have already signed agreements with the United States targeting the 
Chinese company. At the same time, Huawei is building 5G network in 
Hungaryand it is one of the key partner in Serbia in the construction of a 
telecommunication infrastructure that will enable 5G technology. In January 
2020 the EU offered a compromise solution. It published a “toolbox” of 
recommendations for the EU member states to address security risks related to 
the rollout of 5G but did not explicitly ban the involvement of Huawei 
(European Commission, 2020c). Divergent positions of member states with 
regard to Chinese companies and Chinese economic activity, however, could 
provoke new tensions and further affect the EU internal cohesion.  
 
6. Conclusion 
After the end of the Cold War Western Europe strongly believed that its 
political model could be a universal example for the rest of the world. Currently 
the political and institutional uniqueness of the European Union remains but 
the future of the European project seems uncertain. China’s involvement in the 
CEE region is a serious testof the uniquenessand sustainability of the EU model 
of integration itself. The cooperation approach applied by China challenges the 
European approach that has been closely linked to the process of 
democratization in Central and Eastern Europe. Instead of setting political and 
normative criteria, Beijing grants loans and seeks to establish trans-border 
communication corridors that could facilitate the implementation of the Belt 
and Road initiative. Against the background of the fragmentation within the 
European Union, China offers a newapproach which tries to unitethe countries.  
The cumulative effect of the EU crisis, involving the economy, politics 
and, identity, illiberal drift in some CEE countries and China’s expanding 
engagement in the region could further intensifytensions and deficiencies in the 
EU integration model. The growing engagement between China and the 
countries in Central and Eastern Europe per se, however, is not a threat to the 
European Union. The Union faces the challenge of turning China’s proactive 
policy in the region of Central and Eastern Europe to its own advantage. The 
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way the EU takes up the China challenge will be an indicator of the 
sustainability of the EU project. The Union could use it as a reference point in 
its efforts to put its own transformation process on the right track. China’s 
growing penetration in this part of Europe could also serve as a new impetus 
for the European Union to address the new geopolitical reality in the world and 
in the CEE region, in particular, as well as to test its ability to deal with 
increasing external political, social and economic influences and pressures. The 
Chinese challenge in Central and Eastern Europe could act as a catalyst for 
Brussels to stop the slide in Europe’s global power. 
Lack of solidarity, the EU core and periphery approach, a lack of 
strategic vision and an inability to adequately assess current global 
transformations and development coupled with arrogance from Brusselscould 
allow China’s involvement in the CEE region to exacerbate the existing 
deficiencies in the European Union and undermine the success of the EU as it 
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